Accident databases (NRC, RMP, and others) contain records of incidents (e.g., 
Introduction
Since the accidents at Flixborough, Seveso, and Bhopal, the reporting of abnormal events in the chemical industries has been encouraged to collect accident precursors. Efforts to increase the reporting of near-misses, with near-miss management audits, have been initiated by the Wharton Risk Management Center [Phimister et al. (2003) ]. In addition, the AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has facilitated the development of a Process Safety Incident Database (PSID) to collect and share incident information, permitting industrial participants access to the database, while sharing their collective experiences [CCPS (1995) ]. Finally, the Mary Kay Safety Center at Texas A&M University (TAMU), [Anand et al. (2004) ; Mannan et al. (1999) ] has been gathering incident data in the chemical industries.
An incident/accident database, involving oil, chemical, and biological discharges into the environment in the U.S. and its territories, is maintained by the National Response Center (NRC) [NRC (1990) ]. While companies participate voluntarily, raising reliability concerns, the NRC database for Harris County, Texas, is acknowledged to be reliable thanks to the conscientious efforts of many chemical companies in reporting incidents.
Moreover, the Mary Kay Safety Center has concentrated time and resources toward refining the Harris County database to increase its reliability and consistency.
To record accidents, European industries submit their data to the Major Accident
Reporting System (MARS) [Rasmussen (1996) ], while a database for chemical companies in the United States is created from Risk Management Plans (RMP) submitted by facilities subject to EPA's chemical accidental release prevention and response regulations at 40 CFR Part 68 ; RMP (2000) ].
Several researchers have been analyzing and investigating incident databases to identify common trends and to estimate risks. For example, Chung and Jefferson (1998) have developed an approach to integrate accident databases with computer tools used by chemical plant designers, operators, and maintenance engineers, permitting accident reports to be easily accessed and analyzed. In addition, Sonnemans et al. (2003) have investigated 17 accidents that have occurred in a petrochemical industry in the Netherlands and have demonstrated qualitatively that had accident precursor information been recorded, with proper measures to control future occurrences, these accidents could have been foreseen and even prevented. Furthermore, Sonnemans and Korvers (2006) observe that even after recognizing accident precursors and disruptions, the operating systems inside companies often fail to prevent accidents. The results of yet another analysis feature the lessons learned from the major accident and near-miss events in
Germany from 1993-96 [Uth (1999) ; Uth and Wiese (2004) ]. Finally, Elliott et al. (2004) analyze the frequency and severity of accidents in the RMP database with respect to socioeconomic factors and found that larger chemically-intensive companies are located in counties with larger African-American populations and with both higher median incomes and higher levels of income inequality. Note that accident precursors have been studied also in railways, nuclear plants, health science centers, aviation, finance companies, and banking systems.
On the risk estimation frontier, Kirchsteiger (1997) discusses the strengths and weaknesses of probabilistic and deterministic methods in risk analysis using illustrations associated with nuclear and chemical plants. It is argued that probabilistic methods are more cost-effective, giving results that are easier to communicate to decision and policy makers. In addition, Goossens and Cooke (1997) describe the application of two risk assessment techniques involving: (i) formal expert judgment to establish quantitative subjective assessments of design and model parameters, and (ii) system failure analysis, with accident precursors, using operational evidence of system failures to derive the failure probability of the system. Furthermore, a HORAAM (human and organizational reliability analysis in accident management) method is introduced to quantify human and organizational factors in accident management using decision trees [Baumont et al. (2000) ].
In this work, statistical methods are introduced to estimate the operational risk for seven companies, including petrochemical and specialty chemical manufacturers, using the NRC database for Harris County, with the risk estimated as the product of the frequency and the number of consequences. Figure 1 shows the algorithm for calculating the operational risk of a chemical company. First, the frequency of abnormal events of the individual companies, on a yearly basis, is formulated using Bayesian theory. Note that significant differences in the prediction of abnormal events are observed for the individual companies, as compared with predictions obtained when the incidents from all of the companies are lumped together. The Bayesian theory upgrades any prior information using data to increase the confidence level in modeling the frequency of abnormal events; decreasing the uncertainty in decision-making with annual information upgrades [Robert (2001) ]. In addition, Bayesian models are developed to provide the frequency distribution of the day of the week on which the incidents occur, the equipment types involved, the causes behind the incidents, the chemicals involved, the equipment reliability, and the human reliability. Furthermore, the failure probabilities of the process units, as well as the causes of the incidents, are predicted.
Later, a loss-severity distribution of the abnormal events is modeled using extreme value theory (EVT) by formulating a quantitative index for the loss as a weighted sum of the different types of consequences. Through EVT, both extreme and unusually rare events, which characterize incidents reported in the chemical industries, are modeled effectively.
Note that EVT has been applied in structural, aerospace, ocean, and hydraulic engineering [Embrechts et al. (1997) ]. Herein, EVT is introduced to measure the operational risk in the chemical industries.
Subsequently, the operational risk of the individual chemical industries is computed by performing fast-Fourier transforms (FFT) of the frequency and loss-severity distributions to obtain the aggregate loss distribution and the capital at risk (CaR). This approach to measuring risks in specific companies provides a quantitative framework for decisionmaking at higher levels. Using the platform provided, chemical industries should be encouraged to collect accident precursor data more regularly. Through implementation of this dynamic risk assessment methodology, improved risk management strategies should result. Also, the handling of third party investigations should be simplified after accidents.
To begin the detailed presentation of this algorithm, Section 2 describes the concepts of Bayesian theory for prediction of the numbers of incidents annually. Then, the NRC database, the Bayesian predictive models, and the loss-severity distribution using EVT, are described in Section 3. The capital at risk calculations using FFTs are discussed in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Modeling the frequency of abnormal events
Bayesian theory is helpful in formulating the annual frequency of occurrence of abnormal events for a company. The relationship between the mean and the variance of the annual abnormal events, over many years, determines the best choice of distribution. For example, the Poisson distribution is suitable when the mean and the variance of the data are in close proximity. In case the predictions of the Poisson distribution are poor, other distributions, for instance, the Negative Binomial distribution, are used when the variance exceeds the mean [Bradlow et al. (2002) ].
Poisson distribution
The annual number of occurrences of an abnormal event is a non-negative, integer-valued outcome that can be estimated using the Poisson distribution for y:
where y i is the number of abnormal events in year i, and λ is the annual average number of abnormal events, with the expected value, E(y), and variance, V(y), equal to λ. Due to uncertainty, the prior distribution for λ is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution, λ ~ Gamma(α, β):
, is: The predictive distribution to estimate the number of abnormal events in the next year,
y , conditional on the observed Data, is discussed by Meel and Seider (2005) . This gives a predictive mean, (α + s)/(β + N t ), and predictive variance,
, and consequently, the posterior and predictive means are the same, while the predictive variance exceeds the posterior variance.
Negative Binomial distribution
The annual number of occurrences of an abnormal event is a non-negative, integer-valued outcome that can be estimated using the Negative Binomial distribution for y:
where y i is the number of abnormal events in year i, and μ(1-q)/q is the expected annual (mean) number of abnormal events, E(y), and
is the expected variance, V(y).
Due to uncertainty, the prior distribution for μ is assumed to follow a Gamma
and that for q is assumed to follow a Beta distribution, q ~ Beta(a, b): The equipment is classified into 13 major categories: electrical equipment (E 1 ), pumps/compressors (E 2 ), flare stacks (E 3 ), heat-transfer equipment (E 4 ), hoses (flexible pipes) (E 5 ), process units (E 6 ), process vessels (E 7 ), separation equipment (E 8 ), storage vessels (E 9 ), pipes and fittings (E 10 ), unclassified equipment (E 11 ), relief equipment (E 12 ), and unknowns (E 13 ). The Harris County database includes several causes of the incidents, including equipment failures (EF), operator errors (OE), unknown causes (U), dumping (intentional and illegal deposition of material on the ground), and others, with the EF and OE causes being the most significant. Herein, the unknown causes (U), dumping, and others are combined and referred as others (O). Table 1 shows incidents extracted from the NRC database for the seven companies In the absence of information to model the prior distribution for the year 1990, α and β are assumed to be 0.001, providing a relatively flat distribution in the region of interest;
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that is, a non-informative prior distribution. Note that information upon which to base the prior parameters would enhance the early predictions of the models. This has been illustrated for a beta-Bernoulli Bayesian model, using informative and non-informative prior distributions, showing the sensitivity of the predictions to the prior values [Meel and Seider (2005) ]. For company B, using non-informative prior distributions, either the numbers of incidents are close to the predicted numbers or higher than those predicted.
predicted.
When examining the results for the seven companies, the sizable variations in the number of incidents observed in a particular year are attributed to several factors including the management and planning efforts to control the incidents, it being assumed that no significant differences occurred to affect the reporting of the incidents from 1990-2002 -although OSHA's PSM standard and EPA's RMP rule were introduced in 1992 and 1996, respectively. Therefore, when the number of incidents is less than those predicted, it seems clear that good incident-control strategies were implemented within the company.
Similarly, when the number of incidents is higher than those predicted, the precursor data yields a warning to consider enhancing the measures to reduce the number of incidents in the future.
A good agreement between the numbers of incidents predicted and observed indicates a stable equilibrium is achieved with respect to the predictive power of the model. Such a state is achieved when the numbers of incidents and their causes do not change significantly from year-to-year. Note, however, that even as stable equilibrium is approached, efforts to reduce the number of incidents should continue. This is because, even when successful measures are taken year after year (that reduce the number of incidents), the predictive values are usually conservative, lagging behind until the incidence rates converge over a few years.
Next, the results of the Bayesian model checking using the R software package [Gentleman et al. (2005) ] to compute predictive distributions are presented in Q-Q plots.
For company F, Figure 3a shows the density profile of incidents, while Figure 3b shows the normal Q-Q plot, which compares the distribution of z (Eq. (2) Comparing Figures 4a and 3a , the number of incidents at company B are much higher than at company F. In addition, the variation in the number of incidents in different years is higher at company B (between ~25-65) than at company F (between ~0-15). Note that the circles on the Q-Q plot in Figure 4b depart more significantly from the straight line, possibly due to the larger year-to-year variation in the number of incidents as well as the appropriateness of the of gamma-Poisson distribution. The circles below the straight line correspond to the safe situation where the number of incidents is less than that predicted.
However, the circles above the straight line, with the number of incidents higher than those predicted, provide a warning.
The predictions in Figure 4b are improved by using a Bayesian model, involving a
Negative Binomial likelihood distribution with Gamma and Beta prior distributions. The prior distribution for 1990 is obtained using α = β = 0.001, and a = b = 1.0, providing a relatively flat distribution in the region of interest; that is, a non-informative prior distribution. The Negative binomial distribution provides better agreement for company B, while the Poisson distribution is preferred for company F.
Statistical analysis of incident causes and equipment types
In this analysis, for each company, Bayesian models are formulated for each cause and operator errors is more significant. This is consistent with the expectation that equipment performance varies less significantly than operator performance over time.
Figures 6a and 6b show the Q-Q plots for equipment failures and for operator errors, respectively, at company B. When comparing Figures 5a and 6a, the predictions of the numbers of equipment failures at company B are poorer than at company F using the Poisson distribution, but are improved using the Negative Binomial distribution. This is similar to the predictions for the total numbers of incidents at company B, as shown in Figure 4b , compared with those at company F, as shown in Figure 3b . Yet, the predictions for the operator errors are comparable at companies F and B, and consequently, the larger variation in reporting incidents at company B are attributed to the larger variation in the numbers of equipment failures.
Figures 7a -7d show the Q-Q plots for incidents associated with the process units, storage vessels, heat-transfer equipment, and compressors/pumps at company B using
Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions. The Negative Binomial distribution is better for incidents associated with the process units, compressors/pumps, and heattransfer equipment, while the Poisson distribution is preferred for storage vessels.
Statistical analysis of chemicals involved
For each company, an attempt was made to identify trends for each of the top five chemicals associated with the largest number of incidents in the Harris County database obtained from NRC database. However, no specific trends for a particular chemical associated with a higher number of incidents in all of the companies were observed. This could be because different products are produced in varying amounts by different companies. It might be preferable to carry out the analysis for a company that manufactures similar chemicals at different locations or for different companies that produce similar products.
Statistical analysis of the day of the week
For each of the seven companies, Table 2 summarizes the model checking of the Bayesian predictive distributions of the days of the week, with the mean and variance of z displayed. Again, the predictions improve with the total number of incidents observed for a company. As seen, the mean and variance of z indicate that higher deviations are observed on Wednesdays and Thursdays for all of the companies, except G. Lower deviations occur at the beginning of the week and over the weekends. To understand this observation, more information appears to be necessary; for example, (1) defining the operator shift and maintenance schedules, (2) carrying out operator surveys, (3) determining operator work loads, and (4) relating the data on the causes of the incidents to the days of the week, identifying more specific patterns. Furthermore, the higher means and variances for company G on Friday and Saturday suggest that additional data are needed to generate a reliable Bayesian model.
Rates of equipment failures and operator errors
In this section, for an incident, the probabilities of the involvement of each of the 13 Similarly, analyses for equipment types are carried out using Beta distributions, f (e i ) and 
Equipment and human reliabilities
By comparing the causes of incidents between the equipment failures and operator errors, insights regarding equipment and human reliabilities are obtained. In Table 3 , where the range of the annual OE/EF ratio for all of the companies is shown, incidents involving equipment failures exceed incidents involving operator errors. As mentioned in Section 3.1, there is concern about the low OE/EF ratios, which are probably due to the operator bias when reporting incidents. Nevertheless, for petrochemical companies, the ratio is much lower than for specialty chemical companies. This is anticipated because the manufacture of specialty chemicals involves more batch operations, increasing the likelihood of operator errors.
Specialty chemicals and petrochemicals
To identify trends in the manufacture of specialty chemicals and petrochemicals, data for companies C, E, F, and G are combined and compared with the combined data for companies A, B, and D. Note that this is advantageous when the data for a single company are insufficient to identify trends, and when it is assumed that the lumped data for each group of companies are identically and independently distributed. For these reasons, all of the analyses in Sections 3.1 -3.5 were repeated with the data for specialty chemical and petrochemical manufacturers lumped together. Because the number of datum entries in each lumped data set is increased, the circles on the Q-Q plot lie closer to the straight line. However, the cumulative predictions for the specialty chemical and petrochemical manufacturers differ significantly from those for the individual companies.
Hence, it is important to carry out company specific analyses. Nevertheless, when insufficient data are available for each company, the cumulative predictions for specialty chemical and petrochemical manufacturers are preferable. Furthermore, when insufficient lumped data are available for the specialty chemicals and petrochemical manufacturers, trends may be identified by combining the data for all of the companies.
Modeling the loss-severity distribution using extreme value theory
For rare events with extreme losses, it is important to identify those that exceed a high threshold. Extreme value theory (EVT) is a powerful and fairly robust framework to study the tail behavior of a distribution. Embrechts et al. (1997) provide an overview of extreme value theory as a risk management tool, discussing its potential and limitations.
In another study, McNeil (1997) examines the estimation of the tails of the loss-severity distributions and the estimation of quantile risk measures for financial time-series using extreme value theory. Herein, EVT, which uses the generalized Pareto distribution, is employed to develop a loss-severity distribution for the seven chemical companies.
Other methods use the log-normal, generalized extreme value, Weibull, and Gamma distributions.
The distribution of excess values of losses, l, over a high threshold, u, is defined as:
which represents the probability that the value of l exceeds the threshold, u, by at most an amount, y, given that l exceeds the threshold, u, where F is the cumulative probability distribution. For sufficiently high threshold, u, the distribution function of the excess may be approximated by the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD), and consequently, 
where ξ is the shape parameter and the tail index is ξ -1 . Note that the GPD reduces into different distributions depending on ξ. The distribution of excesses may be approximated by the GPD by choosing ξ and β and setting a high threshold, u. The parameters of the GPD can be estimated using various techniques; for example, the maximum likelihood method and the method of probability-weighted moments.
3.7.1 Loss-severity distribution of NRC database A software package, Extreme Value Analysis in MATLAB (EVIM), is used to obtain the parameters of the GPD for the NRC database [Gencay et al. (2001) ]. Because few incidents have high severity levels, the incidents analyzed for the seven companies are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid). Consequently, the incidents of a specific company (internal data) are combined with those of the other companies (external data) to obtain a common loss-severity distribution for all the companies. The loss for an incident, l, is calculated as a weighted sum of the numbers of evacuations, injuries, hospitalizations, fatalities, and damages:
where w e = $100, w i = $10,000, w h = $50,000, w f = $2,000,000, and w d = 1, with N d reported in dollars. Note the sensitivity of l to the weighting factors, which should be adjusted to align with company performance histories.
For the NRC database, the threshold value, u, is chosen to be $10,000. As expected, the NRC database has few incidents that have a significant loss. Only 157 incidents among those reported had monetary loss (l > 0), 64 exceeded the threshold, and 108 exceeded or equaled the threshold. Note that to obtain a satisfactory prediction of the GPD parameters, usually 100 data points are needed. Figure 10 shows the predictions of F u (Lu), the cumulative probability of the losses, L, that exceed the threshold, u. Note that while the cumulative distribution of the losses could be improved with additional data, possibly including data from more companies in Harris County, the predictions in Figure   10 are considered to be satisfactory. The GPD parameters, ξ = 0.8688 and β = 1.7183×10 4 , are computed using the maximum likelihood method. By graphing Figure 11 shows the tail of the loss-severity distribution in detail, with the loss (value at risk) defined at 99.5% (1 − F u (L-u) = 0.005) cumulative probability equal to $1.97 μ 10 6 and the lower and upper bounds on the 95% confidence interval equal to $7.9 μ 10 5 and $6.0 μ 10 6 , respectively. Note that the value at risk (VaR) is a forecast of a specified percentile (e.g., 99.5%), usually in the right tail, of the distribution of loss-severity over some period (e.g., annually); similar to an estimate of the expected return on a loss-severity, which is a forecast of the 50th percentile.
Operational risk
Several types of risks, for example, credit, market, and operational risks are encountered by chemical companies. In this work, the primary focus is on calculating the operational risk associated with a chemical company, which is defined as the risk of direct or indirect losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal resources, people, and systems, or from external events.
Capital charge (that is, capital at risk) of a company due to operational risk is calculated herein. Capital charge is obtained from the total (or aggregate) loss distribution (to be defined below) using the value at risk. Computation of the total (or aggregate) loss distribution is a common statistical approach in the actuarial sciences. This paper applies this approach to risk analysis in the chemical industries. There are four methods for obtaining capital charge associated with operational risk: (i) the basic indicator approach (BIA), (ii) the standardized approach (SA), (iii) the internal measurement approach (IMA), and (iv) the loss distribution approach (LDA). The LDA [Klugman et al. (1998)] is considered to be the most sophisticated, and is used herein.
In the LDA, the annual frequency distribution of abnormal events is obtained using internal data, while the loss-severity distribution of an event is obtained using internal and external data, as mentioned in Section 3.7.1. By multiplying these two distributions, the total loss distribution is obtained. Figure 12 shows a hypothetical total loss distribution for a chemical company. The expected loss corresponds to the mean (expected) value and the unexpected loss is the quantile for a specified percentile (e.g., 99.5%) minus the expected loss. Note that, in some circles, the capital at risk (CaR) is defined as the unexpected loss. However, in agreement with other institutions, the CaR is estimated as the sum of the expected and unexpected losses herein; that is, the CaR is a VaR measure of the total loss distribution.
Highly accurate estimates of the CaR are difficult to compute due to the scarcity of internal data for extreme events at most companies. Also, internal data are biased towards low-severity losses while external data are biased towards high-severity losses.
Consequently, a mix of internal and external data are needed to enhance the statistical Furthermore, it is important to balance the cost of recording very low-severity data and the truncation bias or accuracy loss resulting from unduly high thresholds.
As when estimating the frequency of abnormal events (Section 2), a frequency distribution is obtained initially using Bayesian theory for events with losses that exceed threshold, u. Because operational risks are difficult to estimate shortly after operations begin, conservative estimates of the parameters of the Poisson distribution may be obtained. In these cases, the sensitivity of the capital at risk to the frequency parameter should be examined. After the frequency distribution is obtained, it is compounded with the loss-severity distribution using the FFT to calculate the total (aggregate) loss distribution.
Fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm
The algorithm for computing the total (aggregate) loss distribution by FFT is described in this section. Aggregate losses are represented as the sum, Z, of a random number, N, of individual losses, l 1 , l 2 , …, l N . The characteristic function of the total loss, ) (t z φ , is:
where P N is the probability generating function of the frequency of events, N. l φ is the characteristic function of the loss-severity distribution. The FFT produces an approximation of Z φ and the inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) gives
, the discrete probability distribution of the total loss-severity function, from Z φ . The details of FFT, IFFT, and the characteristics function are found elsewhere [Klugman et al. (1998) ].
First, n p = 2 r for some integer r is chosen, where n p is the desired number of points in the distribution of total losses, such that the total loss distribution has negligible probability outside the range [0, n p ]. Herein, r = 13 provides a sufficiently broad range. It can be adjusted according to the number of abnormal events in a company. The next steps in the algorithm are:
1. The loss-severity probability distribution function is transformed from continuous to discrete using the method of rounding [Klugman et al. (1998) ]. The span is assumed to be 20,000 in line with the threshold for the GPD. The discrete lossseverity vector is represented as
2. The FFT of the probability loss-severity vector is carried out to obtain the characteristic function of the loss-severity distribution:
3. The probability generating function of the frequency is applied, element-byelement, to the FFT of the loss-severity vector, λ >> 1, a much higher value of CaR is expected. Similarly, Figure   14 shows the tail for company F. The total loss at the 99.5 th percentile is $0.43 μ 10 6 and at the 99.9 th percentile is $1.78 μ 10 6 . As expected, the CaR for company F is lower than for company B by an order of magnitude.
Hence, this method provides plant-specific estimates of CaR. Such calculations should be performed by chemical companies to provide better estimates for insurance premiums and to add quantitative support for safety audits.
Conclusions
Statistical models to analyze accident precursors in the NRC database have been developed. They:
1. provide Bayesian models that facilitate improved company-specific estimates, as compared with lumped estimates involving all of the specialty chemical and petrochemical manufacturers.
2. identify Wednesday and Thursday as days of the week in which higher variations in incidents are observed.
3. are effective for testing equipment and human reliabilities, indicating that the OE/EF ratio is lower for petrochemical than specialty chemical companies.
4. are beneficial for obtaining the value at risk (VaR) from the loss-severity distribution using EVT and capital at risk (CaR) from the total loss-severity distribution.
Consistent reporting of incidents is crucial for the reliability of this analysis. In addition, the predictive errors are reduced when: (i) sufficient incidents are available for a specific company to provide reliable means, and (ii) less variation occurs in the number of incidents from year-to-year. Furthermore, to obtain better predictions, it helps to select distributions that better represent the data, properly modeling the functionality between the mean and variance of the data.
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